THE EFFECT OF GCG ON COMPANY PERFORMANCE WITH EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AS A MODERATING VARIABLE by Apriyani, Duwi & Muharam, Harjum
International Journal of Economics, Business and Accounting Research (IJEBAR)  
Peer Reviewed – International Journal 
Vol-5, Issue-2, June 2021 (IJEBAR) 




International Journal of Economics, Bussiness and Accounting Research –IJEBAR      Page 354 
THE EFFECT OF GCG ON COMPANY PERFORMANCE WITH 













Abstract This study aims to analyze the effect of GCG on companies with executive 
compensation as a moderating variable. This study uses quantitative 
methods and the object of research is manufacturing companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2014-2018 period. This 
research uses. The results of this study indicate that institutional ownership 
has no significant effect on company performance. Managerial Ownership 
has a positive effect on Company Performance. The Independent Board of 
Commissioners has a positive effect on Company Performance. The Audit 
Committee has a positive effect on Company Performance. So the fourth 
hypothesis in this study is accepted. KI.EC has no significant effect on 
company performance. KM.EC does not have a significant effect on 
Company Performance. DKI.EC has a positive effect on Company 
Performance. So the fourth hypothesis in this study is accepted. KA.EC has 
no significant effect on Company Performance. So the fourth hypothesis in 
this study is rejected. 
 
Keywords:  The Effect of GCG, Company Performance, Institutional Ownership, 
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The modern economy has an important role in all the industrial factors that exist here. Rapid 
market developments can be seen based on the capital in the economic capital. An alternative 
that becomes an instrument to improve a business is the capital market. This happens because 
the capital market becomes an income or fund for a developing agency. The sector that needs 
the capital market is banking. This is because the bank requires a large amount of funds to 
meet the needs for receivables that will be given to its customers. 
Compensation is the salary given by the employer to the employee for the services 
rendered. It includes both fixed and variable payments that are associated with performance 
levels stated that compensation is an extrinsic financial and non-financial reward provided by 
the employer for the time, skills and effort provided by the employee in fulfilling job 
requirements aimed at achieving organizational goals. Employee compensation is one of the 
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main functions of human resource management. Compensation is important for employers 
and employees to attract, retain and motivate employees. 
Magil and Quinzi (2015) explain that a compensation system has an important purpose 
and a very important role. Large compensation can increase the basic salary received by 
employees. Shareholders argue that compensation is very important and can be aligned for 
shareholders. This can increase a goal to be achieved by the company. The conclusions 
generated in an agency have a significant influence on performance (Buachoom, 2017). 
The size of the company can improve the performance and value of the company. This can be 
seen through research conducted by Raithatha and Komera (2016)concluded that there is a 
compensation system that has a better system. The size of the company can affect the 
increase in an asset. The larger the level of the company, the sales generated at the company 
will be even greater (Weston and Brigham, 2011). 
 
Table 1. Research Gap 
Gap Result  Author / Year 
There is a difference in 
the effect of institutional 
ownership on company 
performance (ROA) 
Institutional ownership 
has a positive effect on ROA 
Ibn Trinugraha Aji 
(2016) 
Institutional ownership 
has a negative effect on ROA 
 Widi and Novia 
(2012) 
There is a difference in 
the effect of managerial 
ownership on company 
performance (ROA) 
Managerial ownership 
has a positive effect on ROA 




has a negative effect on ROA 
Tamimi (2012) 
There is a difference in 
the effect of the independence 
of the board of 
commissioners on company 
performance (ROA) 
Independent 
commissioners have a positive 
effect on ROA 
Brayen Prastika 
Dwi Putra, (2015), Fuad 
(2015) 
Independent 
commissioners have a negative 
effect on ROA 
Valenti et al (2011) 
There is a difference in 
the influence of the audit 
committee on company 
performance (ROA) 
The audit committee has 
a positive effect on ROA 
Putra (2015) 
The audit committee has 
a negative effect on ROA 
Tamimi (2012) 
 
In this study using Agency Theory or the theory of an annual report given to 
shareholders. There is an assumption of sufficient information on a condition in the company 
(Hidayat, 2017). In addition, it also uses stakeholder theory which can carry out an activity 
that is considered the main point in stakeholders. This stakeholder makes a theory that can 
have various kinds of information that is very important for activities that can assume that 
information can be played directly in organizational life (Yuniarti, 2012).Selection of 
manufacturing companies with the following criteria: representing the majority of companies 
listed on the IDX, because of the large capitalization value of the company and for the 
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homogeneity of the data. So based on the research gap and about corporate governance on 
company performance (ROA) with executive compensation as a moderating variable. 
 
Hypothesis 
Effect of institutional ownership on firm performance (ROA) 
Institutional shareholders are financial services in the form of banking, installments, or 
mutual funds. Investors who are shares with very large funds. The proportion of an ownership 
with a percentage made to institutional investors (Christiawan and Tarigan, 2017). In 
accordance with agency theory, the higher the institutional ownership, the better the 
implementation of GCG implementation, so that conflict agency decreases and will increase 
ROA. 
Previous research conducted by Mirawati (2013) aimed at how the measure of 
profitability with ROA has a positive relationship or is interconnected with one another. 
Literature study on the research method is the best method in this research. Data retrieval 
comes from a link owned by idx.com which can be accessed via the internet. The analysis 
used in this research is the classical assumption test. 
H1: There is a positive influence of institutional ownership on company performance (ROA) 
 
Effect of managerial ownership on company performance (ROA) 
Managerial ownership is that shareholders are able to increase the value because the value of 
their wealth will automatically increase. If the owner acts as a manager, it can be assumed 
that the agency problem will disappear. Managerial ownership is measured as the percentage 
of shares owned by the company's directors and their immediate family at the end of the 
accounting year. This measure includes ownership of directors through company vehicles, for 
example, where directors are the majority shareholder in another company that has direct 
shareholding in the particular company under consideration. The definition of managerial 
ownership is consistent with Morck et al. (1988) which defines managerial ownership. In 
accordance with agency theory, the higher managerial ownership means that the 
implementation of GCG implementation is getting better so that agency conflict decreases 
and will increase ROA. 
Previous research conducted by Mirawati (2013) aimed at how the measure of 
profitability with ROA has a positive relationship or is interconnected with one another. 
Literature study on the research method is the best method in this research. Data retrieval 
comes from a link owned by idx.com which can be accessed via the internet. The analysis 
used in this research is the classical assumption test. 
H2: There is a positive influence of managerial ownership on company performance (ROA) 
 
The effect of the independence of the board of commissioners on company performance 
(ROA) 
The board of commissioners is the party appointed to represent the main internal mechanism 
in monitoring the behavior of exploiting opportunities or short-term and long-term benefits of 
management, which is an agency theory perspective. The existence of an independent board 
of commissioners is considered important in the role of corporate practice, because 
conflicting transactions are often found that ignore the interests of public shareholders, in this 
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case minority shareholders and other stakeholders. In accordance with agency theory, if the 
independence of the board of commissioners is higher, it means that the implementation of 
GCG implementation is getting better so that conflict agency decreases and will increase 
ROA. 
Research conducted by Rimardhani et al (2016) examined the Effect of Good Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms on Company Profitability (Study on State-Owned Companies 
Listed on the IDX in 2012-2014) with multiple regression analysis techniques, stating that the 
Audit Committee has no effect on Return On Assets." 
H3: there is a positive influence of the independence of the board of commissioners on 
company performance (ROA) 
 
Effect of audit committee on company performance (ROA) 
The board of commissioners is the party appointed to represent the main internal mechanism 
in monitoring the behavior of exploiting opportunities or short-term and long-term benefits of 
management, which is an agency theory perspective. The existence of an independent board 
of commissioners is considered important in the role of corporate practice, because 
conflicting transactions are often found that ignore the interests of public shareholders, in this 
case minority shareholders and other stakeholders (KNKG, 2006). In accordance with agency 
theory, the higher the audit committee, the better the implementation of GCG 
implementation, so that agency conflicts decrease and will increase ROA. 
Research conducted by Rimardhani et al. (2016) examined the Effect of Good Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms on Company Profitability (Study on BUMN Companies Listed on 
the IDX in 2012-2014) with multiple regression analysis techniques, stating that the Audit 
Committee has no effect on Return On Assets. . This agrees with the research conducted by 
Raja (2016) and Putra and Nuzulla (2017). 
H4: there is a positive influence of the audit committee on company performance (ROA) 
 
The effect of institutional ownership on company performance (ROA) with executive 
compensation as a moderating variable 
The company's financial performance can be interpreted as a financial condition owned by 
the company that can be seen and analyzed based on the profit data available to the company. 
Financial performance can be seen by how the condition of incoming and outgoing money is 
owned by him (Munawir, 2010). In accordance with the stakeholder theory, the higher the 
institutional ownership, the better the implementation of GCG implementation, especially 
with adequate executive compensation, so that stakeholders will be more prosperous and will 
increase ROA. 
Institutional ownership is the number of company shares owned by other 
institutions/companies for example insurance companies, investment management 
companies, private foundations, endorsements or other large entities that manage funds on 
behalf of other people. The existence of parties who see professionally the development of 
investment which results in a very high level of control over management actions so that 
fraud can be minimized. 
Research conducted by Ntim et al (2011) states that First, when the direct relationship 
between executive salary and performance is examined, we find PPS positive, but relatively 
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small. Second, our results show that in the context of concentrated ownership and weak board 
structures; Second-level agency conflicts (director control powers and opportunism) are 
stronger than first-level agency problems (CEO power and self-interest). Third, additional 
analysis shows that CEO power and CG structure have a moderate effect on PPS. 
Specifically, we find that PPS is higher in firms with more reputable CEOs, founders and 
shareholders, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination and 
remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards. , a more powerful and long-
term CEO. 
H5: There is a positive influence of institutional ownership on company performance (ROA) 
with executive compensation as a moderating variable. 
 
The effect of managerial ownership on company performance (ROA) with executive 
compensation as a moderating variable 
ROA is a profitability ratio that shows the company's ability to generate profits efficiently 
from the total assets owned. The greater the average performance of the company's ROA, the 
better the company's profitability, because the rate of return is getting more profit versus 
relatively small assets. Return on assets is an internal factor that is used to measure the 
effectiveness of the company in generating profits by using its assets. 
In accordance with stakeholder theory, that if managerial ownership is higher, it means 
that the implementation of GCG implementation is getting better, especially with adequate 
executive compensation, so that stakeholders are more prosperous and will increase ROA. 
Research conducted by Elloumi and Gueyi (2001) states that companies with high IOS pay 
higher levels of total compensation to their CEO. In addition, high IOS CEOs earn a greater 
proportion of their compensation from forms of performance contingent payments such as 
bonuses, stock option grants, and long-term incentive plans. However, CEOs with weak 
boards are compensated more than CEOs with strong boards. Contrary to our expectations, 
we find that in tall iOS companies with weak boards of directors, CEOs seek to have a higher 
proportion of contingent forms of payment in their compensation. The implication of these 
results is that the practice of contingent compensation can be a more valuable form of 
remuneration for CEOs. 
H6: Executive compensation strengthens the effect of managerial ownership on firm 
performance (ROA). 
 
The effect of the independence of the board of commissioners on the company's 
performance (ROA) with executive compensation as a moderating variable 
The board of commissioners is the party appointed to represent the main internal mechanism 
in monitoring the behavior of exploiting opportunities or short-term and long-term benefits of 
management, which is an agency theory perspective. The existence of an independent board 
of commissioners is considered important in the role of corporate practice, because 
conflicting transactions are often found that ignore the interests of public shareholders, in this 
case minority shareholders and other stakeholders. 
In accordance with stakeholder theory, that if the independence of the board of 
commissioners is higher, it means that the implementation of GCG implementation is getting 
better, especially with adequate executive compensation, so that stakeholders are more 
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prosperous and will increase ROA. UAE national banks' corporate governance (CG) practices 
and UAE national banks' perceptions of the effect of CG on financial performance and 
distress. A modified questionnaire has been developed, divided into two parts. The first 
section covers disclosure and transparency, executive compensation, shareholder relations, 
governance structure, policy and compliance, stakeholder relations, and the board of 
directors. The second part deals with performance and financial difficulties. The results show 
that UAE banks are aware of the importance of disclosure transparency, executive 
compensation, relationship with shareholders and stakeholders, and the role of the board of 
directors. The results also show that UAE banks are aware of the importance of disclosure 
transparency, executive compensation, relationship with shareholders and stakeholders, and 
the role of the board of directors. The results also show that the UAE's national bank 
corporate governance practices are acceptable. In addition, the results reveal that there is a 
significant positive relationship between the UAE national bank's CG practices and 
disclosure and transparency, shareholder interests, stakeholder interests, and the role of the 
board of directors. UAE national bank CG practice and performance level, and that there is a 
significant positive relationship between financial distress and UAE national bank CG 
practice. Finally, this study finds that there is no significant difference in the level of CG 
practices between the UAE's national conventional banks and their Islamic banks. 
H7: Executive compensation strengthens the effect of managerial ownership on company 
performance (ROA) 
 
The influence of the audit committee on company performance (ROA) with executive 
compensation as a moderating variable 
The audit committee is an oversight that can process a report that can make an application of 
an oversight that can be processed as a whole that can calculate the whole that is in a 
company. The audit committee is tasked with providing input to the board of commissioners 
on reports or matters submitted by the board of directors to the board of commissioners, 
identifying matters that require the attention of the commissioners, and carrying out other 
tasks related to the duties of the board of commissioners. In accordance with stakeholder 
theory, the higher the audit committee, the better the implementation of GCG 
implementation, especially with adequate executive compensation, so that stakeholders are 
more prosperous and will increase ROA. 
Research conducted by Valenti et al (2011) aims to investigate the effects of previous 
firm performance on board composition and governance structure. The design/methodology 
used is 90 companies registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations used for this research. The hypotheses were tested using generalized 
linear regression and logit regression analysis. The results show that prior negative changes in 
firm performance are significantly associated with a decrease in the number of overall 
directors and a decrease in the number of outside directors. 
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Research Framework 
Figure 1. Research Framework 
 
Corporate governance on company performance with executive compensation as a 
moderating variable. The company's performance in this study consists of ROA, the GCG 
variable consists of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, independent board of 
commissioners, and audit committee. The control variables in this study are leverage, cash 
flow, and size. This is due to increase the value of the coefficient of determination. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Population and Research Sample 
Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2014-2018 are the 
population of this study. This study uses a purposive sampling method with the following 
conditions: 
1. Companies listed on the IDX from 2014-2018. 
2. Financial reports can be accessed from data sources 
3.Complete research data components during the observation period for executive 
compensation, company performance (ROA), institutional ownership, managerial ownership, 
independent board of commissioners, audit committee, leverage, cash flow and size). 
 
Sources and Types of Research Data 
The data used are IDX Statistics PIPM Semarang and the IDX website (www.idx.co.id). This 
data is included in the secondary data category because it is data from a second party. 
 
Results of Analysis and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics provide a description or descriptive of a data seen from the maximum, 
minimum, average (mean) and standard deviation values. In this section, descriptive statistics 
will be discussed in this study. From the initial data totaling 542 observations, it turned out 
that there were 230 abnormal data so that the normal data amounted to 312 observations. 
 
Table2. Descriptive statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ROA 312 -0,06316 0,16283 0,0522373 0,04165227 
KI 312 0,00 100,00 39,1276 32,56379 
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KM 312 0,00 89,44 8,2155 17,95124 
DKI 312 0,10000 0,75000 0,3979020 0,09473681 
KA 312 2,00 5,00 3,1122 0,44315 
EC 312 -1585,53605 5554,41391 64,3992018 410,52922105 
KI.EC 312 -28809,19 231490,24 2697,3335 16787,97636 
KM.EC 312 -3079,54 31658,71 376,2976 2236,42308 
DKI.EC 312 -65,32655 480,41991 15,0547738 37,50639472 
KA.EC 312 -691,06945 1505,50314 82,5336454 167,55917545 
DER 312 -2,21451 5,86859 0,9851320 0,92802296 
AKO 312 -0,31098 0,27172 0,0563737 0,07322195 
SIZE 312 24,41701 33,32018 28,3771448 1,68236476 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
312     
Source: Processed Secondary Data (2021) 
 
Hypothesis testing 
After all assumptions are met, the next step is to test the hypothesis to determine the effect of 
the independent variable on the dependent variable. The test is carried out using the t test 
with the following results: 
 





Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -0,163 0,027  -6,025 0,000 
KI 0,00007719 0,000 0,060 1,741 0,083 
KM 0,000 0,000 0,211 5,781 0,000 
DKI 0,039 0,015 0,088 2,642 0,009 
KA 0,007 0,003 0,078 2,220 0,027 
KI.EC 0,00000106
8 
0,000 0,043 1,231 0,219 
KM.EC        
0,000000004725 
0,000 0,000 0,007 0,994 
DKI.EC 0,000 0,000 -0,115 -2,935 0,004 
KA.EC -
0,00001575 
0,000 -0,063 -1,601 0,111 
DER -0,014 0,002 -0,304 -9,036 0,000 
AKO 0,323 0,020 0,567 16,431 0,000 
SIZE 0,006 0,001 0,240 6,221 0,000 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Processed Secondary Data (2021) 
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Discussion 
Effect of institutional ownership on firm performance (ROA) 
Hypothesis H1 states that there is a relationship between institutional ownership variables and 
Company Performance (ROA) is rejected. The average value of the institutional ownership 
variable is 39.127563 with the t test results showing that the significance value is 0.083 > 
0.05. Based on these results, the hypothesis H1 is rejected, so it can be concluded that there is 
no positive effect of institutional ownership on company performance (ROA). 
This study is in line with research conducted by Rifqi (2013) examining the effect of 
ownership structure and good corporate governance on financial performance that can be 
linked to ROA in banking institutions. This suggests that there is a negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and profits, but there is no relationship between the benefits 
of an agency. 
This indicates that the low strength of institutional ownership will have an impact on the 
weakening of external control over the company. The existence of institutional ownership can 
help improve more optimal supervision of the company's performance in achieving the 
company's goal of obtaining maximum profit. A high level of institutional ownership will 
lead to greater supervisory efforts by institutional investors so that it can hinder the 
opportunistic behavior of managers. 
 
Effect of managerial ownership on company performance (ROA) 
Hypothesis H2 states that there is a relationship between the Ownership Management 
variable and the Company's Performance (ROA) is accepted. The average value of the 
Management Ownership variable is 8.215520 with the t test results showing that the 
significance value is 0.000 <0.05. Based on these results, hypothesis H2 is accepted, so it can 
be concluded that there is a positive influence of managerial ownership on company 
performance (ROA). 
This research is in line with previous research conducted by Mirawati (2013) which aims 
to determine how the measure of profitability with ROA has a positive relationship or is 
interconnected with one another. Literature study on the research method is the best method 
in this research. Data retrieval comes from a link owned by idx.com which can be accessed 
via the internet. The analysis used in this research is the classical assumption test. 
 
The effect of the independence of the board of commissioners on company performance 
(ROA) 
Hypothesis H3 states that there is a relationship between the Independent Board of 
Commissioners variable and the Company's Performance (ROA) is accepted. The average 
value of the Management Ownership variable is 0.397902 with the F test results showing that 
the significance value is 0.000 <0.05. Based on these results, the hypothesis H3 is accepted, 
so it can be concluded that there is a positive effect of the independence of the board of 
commissioners on the company's performance (ROA). 
This study is not in line with research conducted by Rimardhani et al. (2016) examining 
the Effect of Good Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Company Profitability (Study on 
State-Owned Companies Listed on the IDX in 2012-2014) with multiple regression analysis 
techniques, stating that the Audit Committee has no effect to Return On Assets. 
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Effect of audit committee on company performance (ROA) 
Hypothesis H4 states that there is a relationship between the variables of the Audit 
Committee and the Company's Performance (ROA) is accepted. The average value of the 
Audit Committee variable is 3.112179 with the t test results showing that the significance 
value is 0.027 <0.05. Based on these results, hypothesis H4 is accepted, so it can be 
concluded that there is a positive effect of the audit committee on company performance 
(ROA). 
This study does not support the research conducted by Rimardhani et al (2016) 
examining the Effect of Good Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Company Profitability 
(Study on BUMN Companies Listed on the IDX in 2012-2014) with multiple regression 
analysis techniques, stating that the Audit Committee has no effect on Return On Assets. This 
agrees with research conducted by Raja (2016) and Putra and Nuzulla (2017). 
 
The effect of institutional ownership on company performance (ROA) with executive 
compensation as a moderating variable 
Hypothesis H5 states that there is a relationship between the variable KI.EC and Company 
Performance (ROA) is rejected. The average value of the KI.EC variable is 2697.333464 with 
the t test results showing that the significance value is > 0.05. Based on these results, the 
hypothesis H5 is rejected, so it is concluded that there is no positive influence of institutional 
ownership on company performance (ROA) with executive compensation as a moderating 
variable. 
This study is in line with research conducted by Ntim et al (2011) stating that First, when 
the direct relationship between executive salary and performance is examined, we find PPS 
positive, but relatively small. Second, our results show that in the context of concentrated 
ownership and weak board structures, second-level agency conflict (director oversight power 
and opportunism) is stronger than first-level agency problems (CEO power and self-interest). 
Third, additional analysis shows that CEO power and CG structure have a moderate effect on 
PPS. Specifically, we find that PPS is higher in firms with more reputable CEOs, founders 
and shareholders, higher ownership by directors and institutions, and independent nomination 
and remuneration committees, but lower in firms with larger boards. , a more powerful and 
long-term CEO. Taken together, our evidence provides important new theoretical and 
empirical insights in explaining PPS with a particular focus on optimal contract prediction 
and managerial power hypotheses. These findings are generally robust across econometric 
models controlling for different types of endogeneity, pay, and performance proxies. 
 
The effect of managerial ownership on company performance (ROA) with executive 
compensation as a moderating variable 
Hypothesis H6 states that there is a relationship between the variable KM.EC and Company 
Performance (ROA) is rejected. The average value of the KM.EC variable is 376.297638 
with the t test results showing that the significance value is > 0.05. Based on these results, 
hypothesis H6 is rejected, so it can be concluded that executive compensation strengthens the 
effect of managerial ownership on company performance (ROA). 
This study is not in line with research conducted by Elloumi and Gueyi (2001) which 
states that companies with high iOS pay higher levels of total compensation to their CEOs. 
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Additionally, high iOS CEOs earn a greater proportion of their compensation from forms of 
performance contingent payments such as bonuses, stock option grants, and long-term 
incentive plans. However, CEOs with weak boards are compensated more than CEOs with 
strong boards. Contrary to our expectations, we find that in tall iOS companies with weak 
boards of directors, CEOs seek to have a higher proportion of contingent forms of payment in 
their compensation. The implication of these results is that the practice of contingent 
compensation can be a more valuable form of remuneration for CEOs. 
 
The effect of the independence of the board of commissioners on the company's 
performance (ROA) with executive compensation as a moderating variable 
Hypothesis H7 states that there is a relationship between the DKI.EC variable and Company 
Performance (ROA) is rejected. The average value of the DKI.EC variable is 15.054774 with 
the t test results showing that the significance value is > 0.05. Based on these results, 
hypothesis H7 is rejected, so it is concluded that executive compensation strengthens the 
influence of managerial ownership on company performance (ROA). 
This study is not in line with research conducted by Tamimi (2012). This study found 
that there was no significant difference in the level of CG practice between the UAE's 
national conventional banks and their Islamic banks. In accordance with stakeholder theory, 
if the independence of the board of commissioners is higher, it means that the implementation 
of GCG implementation is getting better, especially with adequate executive compensation, 
so that stakeholders will be more prosperous and will increase ROA. 
 
The influence of the audit committee on company performance (ROA) with executive 
compensation as a moderating variable 
Hypothesis H8 states that there is a relationship between the variable KA.EC and Company 
Performance (ROA) is accepted. The average value of the KA.EC variable is 82.533645 with 
the F test results showing that the significance value is <0.05. Based on these results, the 
hypothesis H8 is rejected, so it is concluded that executive compensation strengthens the 
influence of the audit committee on company performance (ROA). 
This study is in line with research conducted by Valenti et al (2011). The results show 
that prior negative changes in company performance are significantly associated with a 
decrease in the number of directors overall and a decrease in the number of outside directors. 
 
Conclusions and suggestions 
Based on the results of the analysis in the previous section, conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Institutional Ownership has no significant effect on Company Performance. So the first 
hypothesis in this study was rejected. This means the higher and lower institutional 
ownership will not affecting company performance. 
2. Managerial Ownership has a positive effect on Company Performance. So the second 
hypothesis in this study is accepted. It means the higher managerial ownership will 
affecting the higher company performance. 
3. The Independent Board of Commissioners has a positive effect on the Company's 
Performance. So the third hypothesis in this study is accepted. It means the higher 
independent board of commissioners will affecting the higher company performance.  
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4. The Audit Committee has a positive effect on the Company's Performance. So the 
fourth hypothesis in this study is accepted. It means the higher audit committee will 
affect the higher company performance. 
5. KI.EC has no significant effect on Company Performance. So the fourth hypothesis in 
this study was rejected. This means the higher or lower interaction between KI and EC 
will not affecting company performance. 
6. KM.EC has no significant effect on the Company's Performance. So the fourth 
hypothesis in this study was rejected. This means the higher or lower interaction 
between KM and EC will not affecting company performance. 
7. DKI.EC has a positive effect on Company Performance. So the fourth hypothesis in this 
study is accepted. It means the higher interaction DKI and EC will affecting the higher 
company performance. 
8. KA.EC has no significant effect on the Company's Performance. So the fourth 
hypothesis in this study was rejected. This means the higher or lower interaction 
between KA and EC will not affecting company performance. 
While the suggestions put forward in this study include the following: 
1. Issuers and investors should pay attention to corporate governance such as Managerial 
Ownership, Independent Board of Commissioners, Audit Committee because the 
results of this study are empirically proven to have an effect on company performance. 
2. In future research with a similar topic, other variables that affect company performance 
can be added, such as the key management compensation ratio or expanding the sample 
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